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This paper compares the risk and return of investing in equity mutual funds provided by 
the world’s two largest mutual fund families: Fidelity and Vanguard over a long horizon. 
We believe this will help guide investors; this study is an example of the calculations that 
mutual fund companies should facilitate by being required to provide accurate, accessible 
and free data.  Over the entire period 1977 through 2003 both Fidelity’s (no load) and 
Vanguard’s diversified U.S. funds out returned the Wilshire 5000 index; Fidelity’s 
portfolio out returned Vanguard’s portfolio by 0.62 % per year but under returned it by 
0.39 % when risk adjusted. 
 




                                                 
1 We are grateful to Charles Becker, William Bernstein, John Bogle, Thomas Borcherding, Patra 
Chakshuvej, John Dutton, Harold Evensky, Federick Gabriel, Kevin Laughlin, Kenneth Reinker, Allan 
Sleeman, Wells Tower, Daniel Wiener, James White, Thomas Willett and members of the seminar at 
Claremont Graduate University for comments without implying their approval of the product and to the 
Duke Economics Department for a summer research grant. 
   2 
Investors typically choose to invest with one or a few fund families.
2  The market timing 
and late trading scandals have occurred in some mutual fund companies but not others. 
Different companies provide clients with different menus of mutual funds, with different 
advice
3 and give brokers different incentives to sell different types of mutual funds. All 
these considerations suggest that it is important to track the performance of different 
mutual fund families. Fidelity is the largest mutual fund family in the world and 
Vanguard is second largest, so it seems sensible to start by comparing the two. 
 
Vanguard touts its low expenses and corporate governance structure: its owners are the 
shareholders in its mutual funds. Fidelity’s owners are not the shareholders in its mutual 
funds, its expenses are typically higher, the turnover of its funds is typically higher, and 
its equity funds typically hold a larger proportion of their assets as cash. Fidelity touts its 
stock-picking and research prowess. Thus comparison of the performance of the two 
families sheds light on the combined impact of these factors. 
 
This paper has several goals: 
·  To guide investors in choosing between Fidelity and Vanguard. 
·  To present an example of the calculations that mutual funds should facilitate by 
providing accurate, accessible and free data, and either they or an advisory 
service should provide in order to guide investors’ decisions; this paper provides 
a template for the calculations we believe should be readily available to guide 
investors in their choices.  
·  To expose underperformance in order to induce fund families to lower expenses 
and trading costs and to improve their advice.  
·  To determine whether Fidelity managed funds beat their corresponding indexes, 
because the issue of active versus passive investing is a lively issue, as Reinker & 
Tower [2004] (who just look at Vanguard managed versus index funds) discuss.  
                                                 
2 It simplifies decision making and some retirement plans, like Duke’s permit investment with only a few 
families. This study and others like it should be handy for the human resources staff which picks which 
fund families to work with.  
 
3 See, for example, the web pages of Fidelity and Vanguard. Vanguard recommends books including those 
by John Bogle and other web sites. Both web pages offer advisory services.    3 
·  To discover whether there are certain types of funds or investment strategies 
within fund families that investors should shun or embrace.  
·  To help investors make wise decisions about where to invest and to induce fund 
families to pass on more of investment returns to shareholders, thereby 
encouraging saving, for this will enhance the quality and quantity of investment, 
and raise wages, welfare and economic growth. 






This paper asks whether a typical investor in the Fidelity or Vanguard family of funds 
would have seen a better performance over time spans from January 2004 all the way 
back to January 1977 just after the inception of the first Vanguard index fund and for 
shorter spans as well.  Following Reinker & Tower [2004] we feel that since savers invest 
in a bundle of mutual funds, risk adjustment should compare the performance of those 
bundles, as opposed to individual funds. 
 
Consequently, we construct bundles of mutual funds that share characteristics, and we 
compare the performance of the Fidelity bundles with the corresponding Vanguard 
bundles.  Following Reinker & Tower [2004], we refer to these bundles as synthetic 
portfolios. We are interested in how clients of these families fared in the aggregate, so we 
construct these synthetic portfolios using net assets at the end of the previous year to 
weight each year’s annual returns.
5  Vanguard has only no loads, so to make the 
comparison interesting we compare Vanguard’s funds with Fidelity’s no- load funds.
6  
                                                 
4 We were surprised by  how much more clearly we saw the issues after we graphed the data. This 
discovery reminds Tower of he was puzzled by a paradox he had discovered using calculus and did not 
understand. He asked Arnold Harberger about it. Harberger’s answer was “Graph it” and when Tower did, 
the solution to the puzzle became evident. 
 
5 Different fund families have different style biases, so we would expect them to perform differently in the 
aggregate, but part of their advice to clients should consist of recommending the appropriate style mix. Our 
test is designed to capture the impact of this advice or its absence as well as performance of the individual 
funds which comprise the portfolios.    4 
 
The returns of the indexes we use are weighted by market capitalization, i.e. the total 
asset value of each stock in them. The returns of our synthetic portfolios are also 
weighted by net assets. We use net assets at the end of the previous year, provided by 
Morningstar Principia Pro and the Center for Research in Security Prices, CRSP. Thus 
they are weighted by the market capitalization of the mutual funds. Consequently, the 
returns to the portfolios represent how well investors in the mutual funds in each portfolio 
did. We can think of the performance of each of these portfolios as representing the 
performance received by the average investor in these portfolios. 
 
We compare the entire no load portfolios of the two families and also subsets of the two 
families’ portfolios, where the entire portfolios encompass all mutual funds that hold at 
least 75 percent of their assets in equities and have no loads.  The subsets for Fidelity are 
three: Fidelity U.S. diversified portfolios (which are broken down into regular managed, 
Advisor managed and Spartan index), the portfolio of Fidelity Advisor sector funds, and 
portfolios of two Fidelity international funds (regular and Advisor). We also examine the 
Fidelity Select sector funds, which dropped their loads in 2003. The advisor funds can be 
purchased only through an advisor, so it is interesting to find out whether advisors add 
value.  Finally, we compare the performance of these portfolios with the corresponding 
indices.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Dan Wiener notes that this methodology gives credit to a fund family or takes it away based on 
investors’ choices.  “For instance, the fact that lots of people still have money in Magellan is not a Fidelity 
decision. There are plenty of other funds Fidelity has offered that could be used instead. Investors are 
choosing to stay in that fund, which as it has grown much larger, has under performed more. This ‘hurts’ 
Fidelity’s rating. By the same token, when Vanguard closes or adds a high minimum to a hot fund like 
Capital Opportunity, doesn’t this hurt their performance as well? …[T]he investors’ choice to invest in a 
particular fund doesn’t necessarily indicate the fund company has necessarily done something well, or 
poorly on the performance front.” 
Our study assesses the impact of all of these effects. Another useful sort of study would compare 
the outcomes of maximizing strategies for different types of investor who invest in different fund families. 
However, a straw poll of our colleagues leads us to believe that Fidelity and Vanguard investors have 
similar goals, so our approach is useful. 
 
6 The reader concerned with the performance of Fidelity load funds can adjust our calculations for any 
loads and expense differentials. 
   5 
We do not reckon with tax consequences. So this study should be interpreted as analyzing 
returns for Fidelity and Vanguard funds held in a retirement account, where taxes are not 
paid until the funds are sold. Considering taxes would generally put Fidelity managed 
funds at a disadvantage relative to both index funds and Vanguard managed funds, 
because index and Vanguard funds usually have lower turnover rates, which generally 
shrinks taxes. See Jeffrey and Arnott [1993].
7 
 
For both Fidelity and Vanguard we ignore tax-managed funds. For Vanguard we ignore 
the very low cost Admiral funds, which are only available to big investors. We also are 
interested in what investors perceive as equity funds, so we exclude any fund for any year 
in which it had less than 75% of its assets invested in equities at the beginning of the 
year. 
 
Real rates of return are calculated using the consumer price index from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. Throughout the paper, return and standard deviation of return 
refer to annualized real returns. Our average returns are average real geometric 
returns (the constant annualized real returns of investments).   
 
3. THE INDEX BENCHMARKS 
 
In order to provide benchmarks for the performance of our two mutual fund families, we 
consider four key indexes since January 1977, the year immediately following the 
inception of the first index fund, now called the Vanguard 500 Index fund. These are the 
S&P 500, the Wilshire 5000, Morgan Stanley’s Europe, Australia, and the Far East 
(EAFE) and MS’s World indexes. The data are drawn from Morningstar Principia Pro 
disks.  
 
Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 provide summary data for the performance of our index and managed 
portfolios as well as for the indexes.  Our start dates of each of the time spans considered 
                                                 
7 However, as Reinker and Tower [2004] note, persuing tax efficiency may raise turnover, so higher 
turnover does not always reduce tax efficiency.   6 
there are for the inception dates of our synthetic portfolios and January 2000, when the 
U.S. market reached its peak, and the end dates in all cases are January 2004. The 
inception date of each portfolio is defined as the first January following the inception of 
the first fund in that portfolio. In all the exhibits underlining is used to indicate that a 
portfolio out performed the corresponding index, and bolding is used to indicate that a 
portfolio beat the corresponding portfolio of the other company. 
 
The published version of this paper is accompanied by two web appendixes, which 
supplement the material here, Zheng and Tower [2004]. Appendix A contains Exhibits 
A1-A8, which are structured like Exhibit 4, but apply to other portfolios, and Appendix B 
lists the funds that comprise our portfolios. 
 
Since January 1977 the Wilshire 5000 has a higher average return than the S&P 500 
index [Exhibits 1 and A1] and is also less risky, having a lower standard deviation of 
return [Exhibits 2 & A1]. This supports the view that a broad based U.S. index is a better 
benchmark for index funds to mimic than a more narrowly based index.  It also supports 
the use of the Wilshire 5000 index as our benchmark for U.S. equity portfolios.
8 
9  Over 
the entire period, the EAFE and World indexes have performed less well than the two 
U.S. indexes [Exhibits 1 & A1]. 
 
Evaluating these indexes is important, because as  a theoretical matter if markets are 
efficient investing in broad-based indexes is the best strategy and because investing in 
broad-based indexes has been advocated as a wise practical strategy by experts including 
John Bogle and Burton Malkiel (2003). See Reinker and Tower [2004]. 
 
4. RISK ADJUSTMENT 
 
                                                 
8 However, the Wilshire 5000 out returns the S&P 500 for only 11 of the 26 spans beginning in years 
starting from January 1977 through 2003 and ending in January 2004, although the standard deviation of 
the Wilshire 5000 is less than that of the S&P500 for 18 out of 27 spans. 
 
9 Each standard deviation in each exhibit is the estimated standard deviation of the population based on a 
sample, and it is calculated using Microsoft Excel. 
   7 
Investors care about risk as well as return. Consequently, we calculate risk-adjusted 
returns, and we present the risk-adjusted return differentials between each Fidelity 
portfolio and both its corresponding Vanguard portfolio and its corresponding index. Our 
performance differentials are always expressed as the performance of the Fidelity 
portfolio minus that of one of the two alternatives. 
 
Risk adjustment works this way. For each pair of a Fidelity portfolio and its 
corresponding Vanguard portfolio or index, we ask what would the average annual rate of 
return be if the portfolio or index with the higher standard deviation of return, our proxy 
for risk, had been combined with a risk free asset so as to make its standard deviation of 
return equal to that of the portfolio with the lower standard deviation of return. This 
method was developed by Modigliani & Modigliani [1997]. For our riskless rate of 
return, we use the return on the Vanguard Treasury money market fund.
10 
 
We risk adjust in this way, so that risk adjustment never imagines the investor to sell a 
mutual fund short, since this is impossible to do. Investors who are concerned solely with 
return should look at the return differentials we calculate, while those concerned with risk 
as well should look at our risk-adjusted returns. 
 
The Vanguard Treasury money market fund is not truly risk free. But its standard 
deviation of return is small. We can construct the efficient frontier for the high-risk 
portfolio with average return on the vertical axis and standard deviation of return on the 
horizontal, as the proportion of the “risk free asset” is changed in the portfolio. This 
efficient frontier is curved, with the end points lying at the return and standard deviation 
of the Vanguard Treasury money fund and the high-risk portfolio. Reinker & Tower 
[2004] use Microsoft Excel’s solver to equate the standard deviation of the risk adjusted 
high-risk portfolio with that of the low-risk portfolio. In this paper to save effort, we 
approximate the efficient frontier by a straight line through its two endpoints, so that the 
                                                 
10 This method of constructing portfolios and risk adjusting their performance is discussed in more detail in 
Reinker & Tower [2004], which  also discusses how to impute the return on the Vanguard Treasury money 
fund for the early periods when it did not exist. 
   8 
risk-adjusted return of the high standard deviation portfolio is a function of the average 
returns to the high-risk portfolio and the Vanguard Treasury money market fund and the 
standard deviations of these portfolios as well as that of the low-risk equity portfolio.
11 
 
We do not present the risk-adjusted differential for spans less than six years, because risk 
adjustment is sensible only over longer time periods.  
 
5. THE VANGUARD FAMILY 
 
Reinker & Tower [2004] examine the Vanguard family’s U.S. portfolios. They show 
average rates of returns and standard deviations for the Treasury money market fund, the 
(asset weighted) portfolio of U.S. index funds and the (asset weighted) portfolio of U.S. 
managed funds.  
 
Whether the index or managed portfolio has the better return depends on the time span, 
[Exhibits 1, 2, A1 & A2] but the managed portfolio has a lower standard deviation for all 
periods beginning before 2000.
12     
 
For the time span beginning in 1977 Vanguard’s U.S.index portfolio has lower return and 
higher standard deviation of return than the Wilshire 5000 index. But its U.S. managed 
portfolio bests the Wilshire 5000 on both average return and standard deviation [Exhibits 
1, 2,  A1  & A2].  This is impressive, given the expenses of fund management.
13 
 
                                                 
11 The  ideal method of risk adjustment would be to calculate the expected lifetime utility of an investor 
following reasonable saving and allocation rules, who is faced with alternative portfolios.  But the results 
would be specific to the  investor and rules adopted. Moreover, as Reinker & Tower [2004] point out, the 
selection of a less risky asset for dilution of the riskier portfolio is somewhat arbitrary.  Thus, our risk 
adjustment method is an imperfect compromise between usefulness and simplicity.  
 
12 The performance of these portfolios is discussed in detail in Reinker & Tower [2004], Kizer [2005] and 
Reinker & Tower [2005]. 
 
13 Reinker and Tower did not compare the Vanguard portfolios with the Wilshire 5000 and EAFE indexes, 
so the comparison here is new. 
   9 
Vanguard’s first international index and managed funds have inception dates of 1990 and 
1981 respectively, so our start dates for the corresponding portfolios are January 1 of the 
two following years. Over all but one of the spans and over the longest span the managed 
portfolio beats the index portfolio on average return [Exhibits 1 and A3] and over all 
spans the managed portfolio beats the index portfolio on standard deviation [Exhibits 2 
and A3].  The index portfolio has lower average expenses and turnover than the managed 
portfolio.
14   
 
For the life of the Vanguard International index portfolio (since 1991), the Vanguard 
international index portfolio out returns the EAFE index, with a lower standard deviation. 
The same is true of the Vanguard international managed portfolio over its life (since 
1982).  From the start of the international index portfolio, the managed portfolio 
outshines the index portfolio on both return and standard deviation [Exhibits 1, 2 & A3].  
Most surprising to us is that both the Vanguard US managed portfolio and the 
Vanguard international managed portfolio beat their corresponding indexes in spite of 
the expenses the portfolios incur and the fact that expenses are not subtracted from 
index returns. 
 
6. FIDELITY U.S. DIVERSIFIED PORTFOLIOS 
 
The Fidelity U.S. diversified portfolios 
 
Fidelity has three different types of no load U.S. diversified equity funds. The regular 
funds are managed funds that do not need to be purchased through an advisor. The 
Spartan equity funds are index funds with low expense ratios. The Advisor funds must be 
purchased through an advisor, and a fee is generally paid to that advisor.
15 Exhibits 4, 5 
                                                 
14 The figures we use in this paper for the international managed portfolio differ from those in Reinker & 
Tower [2004], because the current paper excludes global funds, which invest both in the U.S. and abroad, 
in order to focus on funds that hold almost exclusively foreign assets. 
15One advisor described to us his company’s charges as follows: “ I can only tell you what we charge, 
which is $4,500 per year plus 50 basis points on the first $5 million, plus 40 basis points on the second  $5 
million, 30 basis points on the third $5 million, and 20 basis points on all else.  Fees are paid quarterly in 
arrears on the average (of beginning of quarter and end of quarter) account balances.  The $4,500 per year 
is subject to adjustment up or down depending on the amount of front end and annual fact finding and   10 
& 6 describe the return characteristics of the portfolios made up of the first group of 
equities, and Exhibit 3 summarizes that information. The Spartan portfolio tracks the 
Vanguard US index portfolio closely. We provide data for it in Exhibits 3, 7 and A5. 
 
The Fidelity regular managed diversified portfolio 
 
Exhibit 4 shows the Fidelity regular U.S. managed diversified portfolio (henceforth just 
Fidelity U.S. managed) to out return  the Vanguard U.S. managed portfolio over the 
longest span in spite of the average expense and turnover differentials, which favor 
Vanguard. Fidelity lags behind Vanguard on a risk-adjusted basis for that same time 
period.  For many shorter periods like the second half of the entire span (beginning in 
1990) the Fidelity portfolio does better on both accounts, regardless of whether the 
performance is risk adjusted.  
 
Exhibit 3 summarizes the exhibits by reporting the performance of Fidelity portfolios 
from their inception and comparing them with their corresponding Vanguard portfolios 
and indexes. It also uses Microsoft Excel’s paired t-test to calculate the probability that 
each Fidelity portfolio will have a higher average return in the future and less risk than 
the corresponding Vanguard portfolio, if future returns and risk are drawn from the same 
population as past returns.  
 
Risk, in this instance, is measured as the average absolute value of deviations of annual 
return about the mean. The probability that the Fidelity U.S. diversified portfolio will 
yield a higher return over the long run in the future is 75.9%, and the probability that its 
risk will be lower than Vanguard’s is 0.2 %. This exhibit also presents the portfolio 
shares for the various funds to help develop a sense of how important each one is.   
 
What causes the differential of the Fidelity return over the Vanguard return to change? A 
regression indicates that there is no time trend.  However, when we regress the 
                                                                                                                                            
analysis.  The asset based fee is for monitoring and keeping up to date on the account investments and 
researching potential investments.” We do not include these advisor charges in our calculations. 
   11 
continuously compounded annual rate of return differential favoring Fidelity on the 
annual percent real return of the Wilshire 5000 index we find that each 1 % percentage 
point per year (henceforth % pt/yr) increase in the Wilshire return raises the differential 
favoring Fidelity by 0.15 % pt/yr, with a t-statistic on the coefficient of 2.23. So it 
appears that when the stock market is rising, the performance of Fidelity is high relative 
to Vanguard, perhaps reflecting the more speculative positions taken by Fidelity investors 
and managers than by those at Vanguard. 
 
Since 80% of Fidelity no-load assets are held in the regular U.S. managed portfolio 
[Exhibit 3], the comparison between the Fidelity and Vanguard portfolios in this section 
is the essence of our investigation. To highlight these calculations we reprise them in 
Exhibits 5 & 6, in different forms. Exhibit 5 shows the investment in each of the two 
portfolios and the Wilshire 5000 index in January of each year since 1977 necessary to 
grow into $100 in January 2004. As in all of our calculations we assume investment 
income is reinvested. Exhibit 5  indicates that the two mutual fund portfolios out-perform 
the Wilshire 5000 index for prolonged periods of time. Since 1994 the two portfolios and 
the Wilshire 5000 have shown roughly equal returns. Both Fidelity and Vanguard 
experience less of a bubble in 2000 than the Wilshire 5000, with Vanguard experiencing 
considerably less.
16   
 
To end up with $100 in January 2004, in January 1977 an investor would need to place 
$11.9 in the Wilshire 5000 index, a smaller $10.6 in the Vanguard portfolio or a still 
smaller $9.1 in the Fidelity portfolio. Thus the Fidelity portfolio beats the other two 
assets. 
 
Exhibit 6 presents the average performance of Fidelity and Vanguard US managed 
portfolios above the Wilshire 5000. On both return and risk adjusted return: the Vanguard 
US managed portfolio beats the Wilshire 5000 index for all spans starting prior to 1984; 
                                                 
16 The graphs use red triangles to refer to Fidelity portfolios, drawing on Fidelity’s pyramid logo  and red as 
the color of faithfulness. They use blue rectangles to denote Vanguard funds, recalling that Lord Nelson’s 
flagship at the Battle of the Nile, Vanguard, was a square rigger. The real value graphs like Exhibit 5 can be 
used to calculate cumulative returns. For example since January 1997 Fidelity’s U.S. Managed portfolio 
returned a total of  [100/9.1-1]*100 percent.   12 
the Fidelity US managed portfolio beats the Wilshire 5000 index for all spans starting 
prior to 1994. 
 
We were surprised at how the two portfolios out performed the Wilshire 5000 index as 
shown in Exhibits 5 & 6. This is consistent with an article by Robert Arnott, Jason Hsu 
and Phil Moore, forthcoming in  the Financial Analysts Journal, and discussed in 
McDonald [2004]. The authors find that indexes constructed using various value-oriented 
metrics (book value, income, revenue, sales, gross dividends, and number of employees) 
outperformed the S&P 500 index, which uses capitalization as its weights.  This implies 
that, historically, there has been room for active management on value criteria to outpace 
indexes. 
 
Fidelity funds held smaller proportions of their assets as equities than their Vanguard 
counterparts. Consequently we expected the Fidelity portfolio to perform less well. That 
Fidelity out  returned was a surprise.  Perhaps it should not have been. Smithers and 
Wright [2000] find that when fundamentals are unfavorable being fully invested in the 
stock market produces lower returns than switching to a money market portfolio, and 
Harney and Tower [2003] make the same prediction.
17 
                                                 
17 Stein and de Muth [2003] in a book plugged by Milton Friedman on the back cover make a similar 
argument. However their simulations do not ask: when should an investor switch back and forth between 
stocks and bonds? Instead they look at the strategy for incremental investments: asking when should an 
investor put new funds into the stock market or into short term Treasuries? They also assume that market 
timing investors are prescient, investing twice as much each year in the stock market as their buy and hold 
brethren when they think the stock market is going to go up in the future. Had a saver who started to invest 
in 1988 followed their advice on any of their value criteria she would have held only short term Treasuries 
since then and done less well than the buy and hold investor. The authors use the price earnings ratio as one 
of their value criteria, without adopting the Shiller [2000] and Harney & Tower [2003] technique of using a 
long period to calculate earnings and therefore reduce their cyclical component. When they suggest 
investing only when the S&P500 index is below its historical moving average, they do not correct for 
inflation.  
They also argue that fundamentals are a bad guide to whether to invest in the stock market in the 
short run but a good guide in the long run.  (pp. 6 and 7). How can this be, given that the long run is the 
aggregate of short runs? The reason is, as Harney and Tower’s [2003] graphs show is that the run up of the 
stock market since 1991 means that if one uses a fundamental like Tobin’s q  to predict rates of return, one 
finds that the critical level of q that provides negative real rate of return gets lower as one goes from 
predicting one year returns to five year returns to ten year returns. This is because one is excluding from the 
long run calculations, initial investments in the highly valued market in the 90’s, which have done well.   
Our prediction is that when studies are done correctly, they will find that to justify market timing, 
one must use momentum as part of the calculation as Smithers and Wright [2000] and Harney and Tower 
[2003] do. Alternatively one must use risk-adjusted returns as one’s criterion, instead of naked average   13 
 
These comparisons elevate our enthusiasm for active management. Both the Fidelity and 
Vanguard portfolios considered in this section outperform the Wilshire 5000 index for 
many periods, suggesting that wise fund selection and management trumps the costs of 
running the mutual funds. 
 
On a risk-adjusted basis, the Fidelity regular U.S. diversified portfolio beat its Vanguard 
counterpart 17 out of 22 times, while losing to it over the longest span.  The US managed 
portfolios of Fidelity and Vanguard tie with the Wilshire 5000 for average performance 
from 1994 onward with the smallest 2000 bubble for Vanguard. Both Fidelity and 
Vanguard beat the Wilshire 5000 from 1977, with Fidelity beating Vanguard from 
1977 [Exhibits 5 & 6]. The out return of the managed funds early on and the similar 
performance to the Wilshire 5000 since 1994 is consistent with the idea that financial 
markets have become more efficient and it is now harder for managed funds to beat the 
indexes. 
 
The Fidelity Advisor US diversified portfolio 
 
Suskind [2004, p.228] writes about Alan Greenspan’s interest in  “the idea of tracking 
and publishing the ex-post performance of analysts’ recommendations (what they 
predicted versus what occurred) so that their credibility and that of their firms could be 
assessed.” Have advisors added value for Fidelity investors in US managed mutual 
funds? 
  
The Fidelity Advisor US managed portfolio performs less well than the Vanguard US 
managed portfolio for all but three spans, on a non-risk adjusted basis. Over its life the 
Fidelity portfolio under performs the Vanguard portfolio by 0.34 % pt/yr and on a risk 
adjusted basis under performs it by 1.06 % pt/yr. [Exhibits 1-3 & A4] Over its lifetime it 
under returns the Fidelity U.S. regular diversified portfolio by 2.15 % pt/yr (in spite of a 
                                                                                                                                            
returns. Also, see Merriman [2004], who compares the index level with a moving average to arrive at buy 
and sell signals and finds that market timing reduces risk.   14 
0.16% pt /year lower expense ratio) with a higher standard deviation [Exhibits 4 & A4]. 
Its lifetime return is less than Vanguard’s U.S. index portfolio by 0.34 % pt/yr, with a 
higher standard deviation. Over its lifetime it also under performs the Wilshire 5000 
index on both a risk adjusted and a non risk-adjusted basis by more than the expense ratio 
for Vanguard index funds over the same period.  
 
All this makes us wonder what advisors who charge anything just to guide investors to 
Fidelity Advisor funds are doing to earn their charges
18. It also makes us recall Bogle’s 
[2001] remark when in lauding an index strategy he writes 
…it is worth considering that the best investment advice may be not only 
priceless, but price-less. 
 
Different classes of Fidelity Advisor portfolios 
 
In this study we choose to look at only classes of Fidelity funds with the lowest expense 
ratios and no front end or deferred loads (payable when the fund is sold). Some of the 
Advisor funds have loads. For example, one Advisor fund picked at random, the Fidelity 
Advisor Large Cap fund comes in classes A, B, C, I  and T. The expense ratios for these 
classes in 2003 were 1.25%, 2.00%, 1.98% 0.84% and 1.40%  of assets per year 
respectively, with loads of 5.75% (front end), 5.75% (front end), no loads if sold after 
more than one year, no loads, and 3.50% (front end) respectively. B shares convert 
automatically to A shares after a seven years and one day.
19 The only fund class we 
consider is the I class, the class with the lowest expense ratio and no loads. Consequently, 
we are considering the returns to the most favored investors. Moreover, these most 
favored investors may be a small fraction of the total. At the end of 2003, $219.21 
                                                 
18 One advisors tells us that his job is to hold the hands of investors and encourage them to stay fully 
invested in equities.  One advisor also suggests that investors who buy advisor funds are less sophisticated 
than those who buy regular funds. 
 
19 This information comes from a phone call to Fidelity. The Fidelity advisor web page, 
http://advisor.fidelity.com, says that B shares convert after a maximum of 7 years. Morningstar says they 
“do not convert” but Morningstar, in response to our alert, tells us they are correcting this. 
   15 




Are the higher expenses and turnover reflected in lower returns? Using 2003 figures for 
expenses and returns for the five classes of this fund, we find that the average 
continuously compounded return is well explained by the expense ratio. The regression 
coefficient of the expense ratio is –0.936 with a t value of –45.9. Thus each one 
percentage-point increase in the expense ratio reduces return by almost one % pt/yr, and 
the t is extraordinarily big given that there are only five observations. We cannot test for 
the role of turnover, because the load funds are operated as one fund, so Morningstar and 
CRSP do not report separate turnover rates for each class of load fund. 
 
Advisor funds with high expenses 
 
Please beware that throughout our analysis we consider only Fidelity’s no load funds. 
The returns on Fidelity’s load funds should be lower due to higher expense ratios and 
loads. For example, the Fidelity Advisor Large Cap fund, Class C, carries an expense 
ratio of 1.98 % per year, whereas the average expense ratio since 1984 for the Fidelity 
Advisor US managed portfolio is 0.73 % [Exhibit A4]. Had that portfolio carried the 
higher expense ratio it would have under returned its Vanguard counterpart by 1.43%  % 
pt/yr, and on a risk adjusted basis by 2.15 % pt/yr.  
 
  
The Fidelity Spartan index portfolio 
 
The Fidelity Spartan index portfolio and the Vanguard U.S. index portfolio have similar 
average returns (.04 % pt/yr lower for Fidelity) and standard deviations (.06 % pt/yr 
higher for Fidelity) since the inception of the Fidelity Spartan index portfolio in 1989.  
This is to be expected as they have similar average expense ratios over the period (0.24 
%/yr for Fidelity and 0.20 %/yr for Vanguard) and turnover rates (6 %/yr for Fidelity and 
                                                 
20 The loads and part of  the expenses are passed on by Fidelity to the advisors.   16 
9 %/yr for Vanguard), and the bulk of both track the S&P 500 index. It also suggests that 
Fidelity’s recent reduction in the expense ratio of its U.S. index funds from 0.20% to 
0.10% will significantly influence future contests [Exhibits 3 & A5]. 
 
We are mindful of Malkiel’s [2003, p.359] point that the average mutual fund under 
performs the index that corresponds to it.  So we were impressed to find that of the five 
U.S. portfolios considered so far over the longest spans, all but the Advisor portfolio and 
the Vanguard index out returned the Wilshire 5000 index. Thus either stock picking or 
choosing the right style plays an important role in obtaining high returns. But our result 
depends on our decision to focus on the subset of Fidelity funds with relatively low 
expenses. 
 
7. FIDELITY U.S. SECTOR FUNDS  
 
Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 8 report results for the Fidelity Select sector portfolio and compares 
them with the Vanguard U.S. managed portfolio.  This sector portfolio and the Fidelity 
Advisor sector portfolio are made up of funds that invest in particular sectors of the U.S. 
stock market. For these portfolios we report two sets of results: the asset weighted results 
and the equally weighted results. The former show the return to investors in the portfolio, 
and the latter show the return that would have been reaped by an investor who at the start 
of each year invested equal amounts in each fund in the portfolio.  The results for the 
Select and Advisor sector portfolios are similar [Exhibits 1, 2, 3, A6 & A7]. As Exhibit 3 
indicates the Fidelity Advisor sector portfolio is much smaller than the Fidelity Select 
sector portfolio and was born later, so we do not devote as much attention to the Advisor 
portfolio. 
 
For every period save one beginning before 2000, the asset-weighted portfolios have 
lower returns, higher standard deviations and consequently lower risk-adjusted returns 
than both the Vanguard U.S. Managed portfolio and the Wilshire 5000 index. Both of 
these Fidelity portfolios substantially under perform the Vanguard U.S. managed 
portfolio on a risk-adjusted basis for every span beginning before 2000.      17 
 
However, a very different picture emerges when we consider the same portfolios, except 
assume that investors invest equal amounts of money at the beginning of each year in 
each of the sector funds. These equally weighted portfolios outperform the Vanguard 
U.S. managed portfolio and the Wilshire 5000 on the bases of both non-risk-adjusted and 
risk-adjusted return for every period beginning before 1999.
21  
 
This made us wonder whether Fidelity Select Sector funds outperform indexes of stock 
performance in those same sectors. There are five Select funds (Financial, Health Care, 
Natural resources, REIT, and Telecommunications) that have corresponding indexes for 
those sectors reported in the April 2004 Morningstar Principia Pro disk (Dow Jones 
Financial, Dow Jones Healthcare, Goldman Sachs Natural Resources, Dow Jones 
Telcom, and Wilshire REIT). The mean of the average annual continuously compounded 
returns for the funds exceeds the corresponding mean for the corresponding index on 
average by 1.97 % pts per year, and the outperformance of the mutual funds is 
significantly greater than zero (on a one tailed test) at the 2.7%  level of significance. 
Thus in spite of mutual fund expenses our small sample of Select sector funds 
outperforms the corresponding indexes.
22 
 
Investors in Fidelity’s sector funds have done less well than those who have invested in 
Vanguard’s managed U.S. portfolio or the Wilshire 5000. For example, investors in the 
Select sector portfolio over its lifetime under returned the Vanguard managed U.S. 
portfolio by 2.57 % pt/yr and under performed it by 4.01 % pt/yr on a risk-adjusted basis. 
But investors, who maintained equal values in either of the two Fidelity sector portfolios, 
saw a higher return than in Vanguard’s managed U.S. portfolio or the Wilshire 5000. 
These diametrically opposed results are consistent with the idea that Fidelity selects 
sectors and stocks within those sectors wisely, but that Fidelity sector investors make 
bad decisions about which sectors to speculate in, although as Exhibit 3 indicates this 
                                                 
21 The Fidelity Select funds carried loads prior to mid 2003. So while today they are no load funds, 
historically they were not. We do not reckon with the historical loads on these funds. 
22 The authors are currently exploring whether this result holds more broadly.   18 
sort of investment constitutes only 5.11 % of the entire no-load portfolio, so most Fidelity 
investors do not invest much in these funds.  
 
The asset weighted Select sector portfolio loses to the Wilshire 5000 with a bigger 
bubble in 2000; the equal weighted portfolio beats the Wilshire 5000 with a smaller 
bubble in 2000. [Exhibits 1, 2, 3 & 9]. 
 
Bogle’s [2001] has lamented: 
 
The siren song of past performance, sung by fund managers and distributors and 
danced to by investors, has resulted in investment decisions that are unwise to a 
fault. … Investors value their portfolios frequently, and trade their fund shares 
like stocks. These characteristics lead to foolish investment behavior. 
 
This seems to apply to investors in the Fidelity select portfolio.
23 
 
Our results also imply that orangutans throwing darts at a list of select sector funds 
would have produced higher returns than did investors, whether or not they were 
guided by advisors. 
 
8. FIDELITY INTERNATIONAL FUNDS 
                                                 
23 William Bernstein has mentioned to us that the Morningstar unpopular fund strategy, which selectively 
invests in those areas that have drawn the least assets in the past three years has made significant excess 
returns in the process. 
Hilsenrath [2004] quotes Richard Thaler as noting that when Swedish social security was 
privatized “Swedish investors tended to pile into risky technology stocks and invested too heavily in 
domestic stocks. He thinks U.S. reform, if it happens, should be less flexible. ‘If you give people 456 
mutual funds to choose from they’re not going to make great choices,’ he says.” This position is consistent 
with our observations here. 
Clements [2004] makes the same point:  
“Unfortunately, during the past decade, my confidence in the investment acumen of ordinary 
investors has been shaken. I have come across too many serial blunderers, folks who jumped from 
technology stocks in the late 1990s, to bonds in the bear market, to real-estate investment trusts in 2004, 
always buying after the big money has already been made. 
These investors have neither the education nor the emotional fortitude to invest sensibly. That is 
one of the reasons I believe replacing traditional company pension plans with 401(k) plans has been a 
mistake. Similarly, I fear that the privatization of Social Security will be a disaster unless it is accompanied 
by a slew of safeguards.”  Need to quote the Clements article the day before Thanksgiving in the WSJ.   19 
 
The Fidelity regular international portfolio and the Fidelity Advisor international 
portfolio account for only 5 % and 0.2 % of our entire portfolio of Fidelity funds as 
Exhibit 3 indicates. Exhibits 1, 2, 3, A1, A3, A8 and A9 present data for the international 
portfolios and the EAFE index. Exhibit 8 compares the Fidelity international managed 
portfolio with the Vanguard international managed portfolio and the EAFE index. On a 
risk-adjusted basis since inception, the Fidelity regular international portfolio under 
returns its Vanguard managed counterpart by 2.16 % pt/yr, while the Fidelity Advisor 
international portfolio out returns the Vanguard portfolio by 1.18 % pt/yr.  Since the start 
of the Advisor portfolio in 1996 it has returned 1.72 % pt/yr more than its Fidelity regular 
counterpart with 2.82 % /yr less standard deviation. Thus here advisors’ allocation advice 
is apparently beneficial. 
 
Over the longest spans, the Vanguard international managed and the Vanguard 
international index portfolios have out returned the EAFE index by 0.80 and 1.62 % pt/yr 
respectively, with a lower standard deviation.  The Fidelity Advisor portfolio has out 
returned the EAFE and the Fidelity regular international portfolio under performed the 
EAFE by only 0.33 % pt/yr, which is small, given costs and foreign taxes, although the 
Fidelity standard deviations were higher. So these international portfolios have 
performed creditably relative to the EAFE index. 
 
9. FIDELITY ENTIRE PORTFOLIO 
 
Exhibit 10 compares the performance of the Fidelity entire portfolio with the Vanguard 
entire portfolio.  The entire portfolios consist of all the mutual funds discussed above 
except for the select funds, which carried a load at the time, and we have added other 
funds, again in proportion to their asset weights. For both companies we have added in 
global funds. In the case of Vanguard we added in Vanguard’s tiny collection of four 
sector funds, and in the case of Fidelity we added back in its three regular sector funds, 
which we had not considered previously. Thus, our goal is to present the performance of   20 
the two families’ entire no load fund portfolios.  As before, in each case, we weight 
return figures by net assets at the end of the previous year. 
 
The Fidelity entire portfolio has returned more than the Vanguard entire portfolio over 
the longest span, with the Fidelity portfolio returning 0.33 % pt/yr per year more without 
risk adjustment. But, Fidelity has returned 0.70 % pt/yr less on a risk-adjusted basis. If 
past and future returns are drawn from the same population, the probability that Fidelity 
will have a higher return than Vanguard over an infinite time horizon is 61.3%, and the 
probability that Fidelity will have a lower risk is 0.1%. The corresponding figures for the 
Fidelity regular US managed portfolio versus the Vanguard U.S. managed portfolio are 
75.9 % and 0.2 % respectively. [Exhibit 3]. The  return of Fidelity’s entire portfolio 
beats Vanguard’s over the entire period, but the ranking of risk adjusted returns is 
reversed, and the two portfolios are tied from 1994, with a smaller bubble for 
Vanguard. [Exhibits 3 & 9]. 
 
To explain fluctuations in the differential returns we regressed the annual continuously 
compounded Fidelity entire portfolio rate of return minus the same for Vanguard on time 
and the return on the World index. Finding no important or significant time trend, we 
dropped the time and used the return of the World index as our sole independent variable. 
We discover that each one % pt/yr increase in the return of the World index raises the 
differential in favor of Fidelity by 0.08 % pt/yr, with a t-value of 1.34. This is similar to 
our result for the Fidelity U.S. diversified portfolio, and we offer the same explanation 
for it.  
 
The Fidelity entire portfolio beats the World index on return for every period beginning 
prior to 2002 and on risk-adjusted return for every period. This is remarkable, given the 
taxes levied by foreign countries on dividends paid by their companies. It reflects, in part, 
the heavy weighting of the Fidelity portfolio in US stocks, which have performed well 
relative to foreign stocks over the period. 
   21 
Exhibit 11 reprises the information in Exhibit 10 in graphical form. It shows how many 
real dollars would have had to be invested in the two entire portfolios at each year to 
generate $100 in January 2004. The two portfolios hug one another back through 1994, 
while in the spans up to 1994 Vanguard was the superior performer.  
 
The decision of what to put into the Fidelity entire portfolio is somewhat arbitrary. Had 
we included the sector funds, the Fidelity entire portfolio would have looked worse. Had 
we incorporated Fidelity Advisor funds with loads and higher expenses the results would 




10. MANAGED FUNDS VERSUS INDEXING 
 
John Bogle [2004] writes:  
 
Our introduction of  [the first index fund] was … dubbed ‘Bogle’s Folly,” and 
described as un-American.  Fidelity chairman Edward C. Johnson led the skeptics 
assuring the world that Fidelity had no intention of following Vanguard’s lead.  ‘I 
can’t believe that the great mass of investors are going to be satisfied with just 
receiving average returns.  The name of the game is to be the best.’ 
 
This makes us wonder: how have Fidelity managed funds fared relative to the indexes 
and index funds?  
 
Both of the Fidelity non-Advisor U.S. diversified portfolios (the indexed and the 
managed) for the longest spans, out returned the Wilshire 5000 index whether or not the 
returns are risk adjusted [Exhibits 1-7 & A5]. 
 
                                                 
24 When the Select funds are included in the calculation since January 1977 the Fidelity entire portfolio 
under returns the Vanguard entire portfolio by 0.10 % pt/yr and underperforms it by 1.04 % pt/yr on a risk 
adjusted basis.   22 
That both the Fidelity and Vanguard managed US portfolios have out performed the 
Wilshire 5000 index since 1977, whether or not return is risk adjusted lends credence 
to Johnson’s early distain for index funds, but recently the advantage of the managed 
portfolios has shrunk [Exhibit 6]. 
 
Since the start of the Fidelity Spartan index portfolio in 1989 it under returned the 
Fidelity US managed portfolio by 1.03 % pt/yr, and its standard deviation of return was 
0.61 %/ year higher. Over the same time span it out returned the Vanguard U.S. managed 
portfolio by 1.10 % pt/yr, but its standard deviation was 1.43 % pt/yr higher. So 
historically, Fidelity’s Spartan Index portfolio was beaten by the Fidelity U.S. regular 
managed portfolio and out returned the Vanguard U.S. managed portfolio [Exhibits 1 & 
2]. Both the Fidelity and Vanguard US index portfolios beat the Wilshire 5000 on 
average return, whether risk adjusted or not, since inception of the Fidelity index 
portfolio in 1989. [Exhibit 7].
25 
 
The Fidelity and Vanguard entire portfolios performed well compared to the World 
index. The Fidelity entire portfolio out returned the world index by 2.67 % pt/yr since 
1977 and was the winner on return over all but the shortest two of the 27 spans 
considered. Of course, international funds have to pay taxes to foreign governments, so 
global indexes have a built-in advantage over global mutual funds. [Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 10, 
& 11]. 
 
Fidelity only has one international index fund, the International Index Fund. It tracks the 
EAFE index. Its inception date is quite recent, November 1997. Over the five years 
ending March 2004 it has under returned the EAFE index by a mere 0.02 % pt/yr. [See 
Morningstar]. 
 
                                                 
25 We are in the process of extending Kizer [2005] and Reinker & Tower [2005] to find out whether style 
choice or stock picking skill accounts for the superior performance of the managed funds.   23 
Since 1987, the inception of the Fidelity international managed portfolio, the Fidelity 
portfolio under returns the EAFE index by a small 0.33 % pt/yr, while the Vanguard 
international managed portfolio beats it by a substantial 1.67 % pt/yr. [Exhibits 3 & 9]. 
 
11. FIDELITY VERSUS VANGUARD: SUMMARY 
 
Exhibit 3 summarizes the exhibits by reporting the performance of Fidelity portfolios 
from their inception and comparing them with their corresponding Vanguard portfolios 
and indexes. Of particular interest is how Vanguard and Fidelity portfolios have fared 
since the peak of the market bubble early in 2000. The last column in the figure shows 
Fidelity’s portfolios to have fared considerably worse than Vanguard’s during that time. 
This is consistent with the idea that Fidelity investors take on more risk than Vanguard 
investors do. 
 
Exhibit 12 provides a visual interpretation of some of the material in Exhibit 3. It shows 
the return differential and the standard deviation differential between each Fidelity 
portfolio and its Vanguard counterpart, for the life of each Fidelity portfolio. For this 
collection of portfolios in all but three cases the Fidelity return is lower and in all cases 
the Fidelity standard deviation is higher. One case where Fidelity out returns is the 
crucially important regular U.S. diversified portfolio, which constitutes 80% of the 
Fidelity entire portfolio. 
 
Fidelity managed fund portfolios typically have higher standard deviations than do the 
comparable portfolios made up of corresponding Vanguard funds. This is surprising, as 
Fidelity funds typically hold a larger proportion of their assets as cash. We need to cite 
numbers here. [Exhibit 12]. 
 
 If Fidelity were to have lowered its expenses to that of Vanguard, for the entire portfolio 
it would have raised the return contests it won from 19 to 24 out of 27 spans and the risk 
adjusted return contest from 9 to 15 out of 23 spans. Thus expenses affect the likelihood 
of winning these contests substantially.   24 
 
To assess the role of expenses and turnover, we regressed the risk-adjusted annual 
continuously compounded return differential favoring Fidelity over Vanguard over the 
life of each Fidelity portfolio on the average expense ratio and turnover differentials.  Our 
regression equation is: 
 
Return = -0.479 * Expense Ratio - 0.0335 * Turnover + 1.00; R
2 = 0.494 
   (0.207)      (1.74)       
where the t’s are in parentheses.  This equation implies that each one percentage point 
increase in the expense differential reduces the return differential by almost half a  % 
pt/yr and each 100 percentage point increase in turnover reduces the return differential by 
over three % pt/yr.  We note the statistical weakness of the relationship. 
 
Exhibit 13 graphs this risk-adjusted return differential versus the weighted average of the 
Expense ratio and turnover, where the weighs are the absolute values of the coefficients 
from the regression. It shows how high differentials for average expense ratios and 
turnover reduce the risk-adjusted return differential. It also shows that on a risk 





We have presented lots of data here. Our conclusions defy simple summary. It is 
tempting to look just at the longest spans, but performance contests depend on the time 
period involved. Still, as a matter of history, since January 1977, the year after Vanguard 
founded the first index fund, an investor who bought and held the Fidelity entire portfolio 
would have earned 0.33 % pt/yr more with higher risk than one who bought and held the 
Vanguard entire portfolio and 0.70% % pt/yr less with the same risk; part of this latter 
differential is likely explained by Vanguard’s expense ratio being 0.40 % age points 
lower than Fidelity’s and Vanguard’s turnover rate being 69 % age points lower. But it is   25 
not clear how far back an investigator should look to help make a guess about future 
performance.  
 
In reflecting on all these calculations we also conclude that Fidelity portfolios are riskier 
than Vanguard portfolios,
26 Fidelity investors have done a bad job picking sector funds, 
although sector funds may be good investments if chosen sensibly and investors should 
avoid Fidelity Advisor funds with high loads and expenses. 
 
Malkiel [2003, p.374] comments: 
 
I have often said that the two best things that have happened to the mutual-fund 
industry are the arrival of Jack Bogle (who started the low-cost consumer-friendly 
Vanguard Group of mutual funds during the mid-1970s) and Don Phillips (who in 
the early 1990s initiated the extremely useful Morningstar Service, which 
publishes information on mutual funds.” Malkiel [2003, p.374].
27 
                                                 
26 William Bernstein has suggested to us that Fidelity is basically a growth house and Vanguard a value 
house which could explain most, if not more than most, of the difference. 
 
27 With regard to the second half of the comment, Dan Wiener tells us that Joe Mansueto founded 
Vanguard, while Phillips was hired by Mansueto as its editor. Also, while we find the Morningstar service 
marvelously helpful, we would appreciate more information about exactly what day of the year the data 
applies to, wish that Morningstar would publish data on funds that have been killed, and lament the 
incorrect data on net assets which Morningstar typically publishes for the first and second complete years 
of operation of funds, although Morningstar has corrected the figures for Vanguard and has responded 
enthusiastically to correct erroneous data. We also wish that CRSP and Morningstar would publish the date 
at which a fund was acquired by a fund family, rather than the inception date of a fund, which may be much 
earlier, but part of the blame here may lie with the failure of fund families to provide this data 
automatically. Fidelity reports that dates are identical for the inception and acquisition for all of their funds, 
but this is not the case with Vanguard.  
Finally, we are curious to know why there are so many discrepancies between the data from 
Morningstar , CRSP and mutual fund companies. We  have attempted to resolve differences by using the 
more reasonable number. These differences are particularly noticeable for expense ratios. Morningstar tells 
us that it uses data submitted to it by fund companies and often these data are subsequently updated by the 
company but not Morningstar.  
Researchers in this area should be aware that funds change their names frequently, so it is easier to 
categorize funds by their CRSP identification numbers and their names.  This makes categorizing funds 
tricky. For example the fund with CRISP ID 00816 was at one point in its life an advisor fund, but was a 
regular fund before and after that period.  Also in 1989 the CRISP ID applies to an automotive and a 
government bond mutual fund. Morningstar and CRSP could with relatively low cost develop programs to 
check their work for consistency . The moral for researchers is that for accuracy it is essential to double 
check unreasonably high and low numbers and to examine the data for unusual patterns and mutual fund 
names. We would like to see fund families publish these figures with information about exactly how they 
are calculated.   26 
 
Since January 1994 both of the entire portfolios have had almost identical returns, with a 
bigger bubble in 2000 for Fidelity. Since January 1994 both of the two U.S. managed 
portfolios and the Wilshire 5000 index have all had almost identical returns. Since 1977 
the two U.S. managed portfolios have beaten the Wilshire 5000 index whether or not the 
returns are risk adjusted. Since 1987, the inception of the Fidelity international managed 
portfolio, the Vanguard international managed portfolio has beaten the EAFE index by a 
considerable margin and the Fidelity international portfolio has lost to it by only a bit 
whether or not the returns are risk adjusted. All this  leads us to conclude that  both fund 
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1977 1982 1984 1987 1989 1991 1996 2000
US Managed 1977 9.30 11.56 10.61 9.68 9.90 10.74 6.57 -5.92
Advisor US Managed 1984 n.a. n.a. 8.46 7.52 7.88 9.71 5.35 -7.96
Spartan Index 1989 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.87 9.19 6.78 -7.50
Select Sector Asset wtd 1982 n.a. 7.33 5.37 6.51 7.85 8.05 5.37 -10.95
Sel Sector Equally wtd 1982 n.a. 11.14 9.98 10.11 11.42 12.68 9.41 1.37
Adv Sector Asset  wtd 1996 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.26 -8.75
Adv Sector Equally wtd 1996 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 9.24 -3.90
International Managed 1987 n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.67 1.75 2.42 2.67 -5.69
Advisor Intl Managed 1996 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.39 -6.71
Entire 1977 9.05 11.25 10.18 9.30 9.50 10.31 5.24 -5.94
VANGUARD
Treasury Money 1977 7.66 2.56 2.20 1.78 1.73 1.56 1.62 0.70
US Managed 1977 8.68 9.90 8.80 7.79 7.77 9.61 6.62 -2.93
US Index 1977 7.66 10.06 9.42 8.51 8.90 9.31 6.76 -7.14
International Managed 1982 n.a. 8.48 7.55 4.67 4.67 4.29 2.69 -6.13
International Index 1991 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.47 1.24 -7.07
Entire 1977 8.72 10.00 8.95 7.71 7.61 9.16 5.03 -4.45
S&P 500 1977 8.02 10.00 9.54 8.77 8.90 9.03 6.82 -7.64
Wilshire 5000 1977 8.19 9.41 8.97 8.39 8.59 9.11 6.55 -6.96
EAFE 1977 6.84 7.08 7.43 3.00 0.58 2.67 0.84 -8.15
World 1977 6.38 7.64 7.53 5.00 3.56 5.10 3.34 -8.61
underline means beat corresponding index
INDEXES bold means beat both corresponding Fidelity and Vanguard portfolios
bold means beat corresponding Fidelity portfolio
EXHIBIT 1
Average return from 
underline means beat corresponding index
Name                inception
FIDELITY                           bold means beat corresponding Vanguard portfolio                                                                                                                                                      
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EXHIBIT 2
Average Standard Deviations for Portfolios and Indexes
1977 1982 1984 1987 1989 1991 1996
US Managed 1977 16.25 16.50 17.03 17.46 18.11 18.02 19.45
Advisor US Managed 1984 n.a. n.a. 17.41 18.63 19.37 19.18 21.66
Spartan Index 1989 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 18.72 18.90 21.65
Select Sector Asset wtd 1982 n.a. 21.20 21.27 22.31 23.37 24.32 28.11
Sel Sector Equally wtd 1982 n.a. 15.16 15.42 15.56 16.36 16.15 17.05
Adv Sector Asset  wtd 1996 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 22.12
Adv Sector Equally wtd 1996 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 23.91
International Managed 1987 n.a. n.a. n.a. 21.11 22.36 23.28 27.42
Advisor Intl Managed 1996 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 24.60
Entire 1977 16.08 16.35 16.84 17.25 17.91 17.82 19.48
VANGUARD
Treasury Money 1977 2.44 2.04 1.72 1.43 1.51 1.48 1.70
US Managed 1977 14.31 15.40 15.76 16.76 17.29 16.88 19.09
US Index 1977 16.10 16.04 16.76 17.63 18.65 18.79 21.44
International Managed 1982 n.a. 20.23 20.17 17.46 18.46 18.37 20.29
International Index 1991 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 18.54 21.58
Entire 1977 14.06 15.07 15.44 16.18 16.88 16.54 19.06
INDEXES bold means beat both corresponding Fidelity and Vanguard portfolios
S&P 500 1977 15.53 15.66 16.38 17.24 18.35 18.60 21.49
Wilshire 5000 1977 15.40 15.84 16.53 17.26 18.29 18.43 20.99
EAFE 1977 21.82 23.30 23.98 19.31 19.28 18.91 21.68
World 1977 16.40 17.36 18.04 16.86 17.55 17.27 20.80
bold means beat corresponding Fidelity portfolio
underline means beat corresponding index
Name              inception Standard deviation from
underline means beat corresponding index


















































































































































































Start year 1977 1984 1989 1982 1982 1996 1996 1987 1996 1977
Avg retn 0.62 -0.34 -0.04 -2.57 1.24 -1.35 2.62 -2.00 1.71 0.33
SD 1.94 1.65 0.06 5.80 -0.24 3.04 3.86 3.65 4.31 2.02
RA retn -0.39 -1.06 -0.06 -4.01 1.37 -1.90 1.24 -2.16 1.18 -0.70
Avg exp 0.17 0.42 0.05 0.56 n.a. 0.63 n.a. 0.73 0.57 0.40
Avg TO 66 54 -3 94 n.a. 86 n.a. 53 38 69
retn > Van's  75.9 27.4 44.1 29.0 77.9 42.3 61.6 25.3 76.6 63.1
risk < Van's 0.2 8.2 46.8 21.5 59.7 16.4 97.2 36.0 16.0 0.1
Not RA  19/27  0/12 4/15  1/22  22/22  0/8  5/8  7/17  7/8  19/27
RA  17/22  4/10 1/10  0/21  20/20  0/4  4/7  5/15 5/6  14/22
Not RA 1.11 -0.51 0.27 -2.57 1.24 -1.28 2.69 -0.32 3.56 2.67
RA 0.67 -0.86 0.1 -4.01 1.37 -1.49 1.99 -0.41 3.20 2.77
Fido minus Van retn 2000-04 -3.00 -1.00 -0.36 -8.02 4.30 -5.82 -0.97 0.44 -0.58 -1.48




Characteristics of Fidelity Funds From Inception: Differentials are values for 
Fidelity minus values for corresponding Vanguard Portfolio. Fidelity minus 
index is the average return of the Fidelity portfolio minus that of the 















2003 25.85 32.08 0.84 0.50 51 38 -6.24 -2.72
2002 -1.15 -0.25 34.08 40.13 0.85 0.48 56 42 -0.90 -1.25
2001 -5.52 -4.00 25.70 29.63 0.84 0.46 63 42 -1.53 -0.76
2000 -5.92 -2.93 21.06 24.21 0.82 0.40 68 40 -3.00 1.04
1999 -1.30 -0.45 21.14 21.53 0.79 0.39 69 39 -0.86 0.54
1998 2.61 1.75 21.33 19.88 0.77 0.39 68 40 0.85 0.76 0.92 0.94
1997 5.40 4.84 20.79 19.97 0.76 0.37 69 39 0.56 0.39 0.42 0.66
1996 6.57 6.62 19.45 19.09 0.77 0.39 76 38 -0.04 -0.15 0.03 0.42
1995 8.96 9.08 19.61 19.39 0.78 0.44 79 37 -0.12 -0.20 -0.23 0.39
1994 7.74 7.86 18.96 18.76 0.80 0.45 82 36 -0.12 -0.19 -0.20 0.32
1993 8.74 8.20 18.23 17.81 0.81 0.43 86 35 0.54 0.36 0.78 1.22
1992 8.91 8.35 17.38 16.98 0.83 0.36 92 35 0.56 0.37 1.14 1.59
1991 10.74 9.61 18.02 16.88 0.84 0.38 94 34 1.13 0.49 1.63 1.82
1990 8.97 7.41 18.45 17.91 0.85 0.43 97 33 1.56 1.32 1.38 1.42
1989 9.90 7.77 18.11 17.29 0.85 0.46 97 32 2.13 1.72 1.31 1.38
1988 10.52 8.56 17.64 16.97 0.87 0.51 96 33 1.96 1.60 1.66 1.68
1987 9.68 7.79 17.46 16.76 0.88 0.46 97 33 1.88 1.54 1.28 1.19
1986 10.19 8.16 17.05 16.31 0.88 0.55 97 33 2.03 1.64 1.61 1.45
1985 11.21 8.92 17.17 16.17 0.89 0.58 98 32 2.29 1.71 1.70 1.47
1984 10.51 8.80 17.03 15.76 0.89 0.69 98 33 1.72 1.03 1.54 1.28
1983 11.11 9.49 16.80 15.68 0.89 0.74 98 34 1.62 0.97 1.68 1.35
1982 11.56 9.90 16.50 15.40 0.89 0.84 100 34 1.66 0.97 2.15 1.74
1981 10.47 9.56 16.87 15.15 0.88 0.70 101 33 0.91 0.01 2.23 1.94
1980 10.72 9.59 16.53 14.82 0.88 0.68 102 34 1.14 0.17 2.09 1.83
1979 10.48 9.45 16.25 14.54 0.88 0.67 102 34 1.03 0.03 1.59 1.31
1978 10.09 9.21 16.07 14.31 0.88 0.70 101 34 0.87 -0.14 1.46 1.14
1977 9.30 8.68 16.25 14.31 0.87 0.70 99 33 0.62 -0.39 1.11 0.67






ratio  Turnover 






The Fidelity U.S. Managed Portfolio vs. the Vanguard U.S. Managed 
Portfolio and the Wilshire 5000 Index (%)
Start 
year  32 
EXHIBIT 5
A tie from 1994 onward, with the smallest 2002 bubble for
Vanguard. Both Fidelity and Vanguard beat the Wilshire 5000
from 1977. Fidelity beats Vanguard from 1977.
Real Values for US Managed Portfolios of Fidelity & Vanguard 
and the Wilshire 5000 that grow to $100 in 2004
Real Values for Portfolios  and the Wilshire 5000 that 
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EXHIBIT 6
Average Performance of Fidelity & Vanguard US Managed Portfolios 
above the Wilshire 5000
On both return and risk adjusted return: the Vanguard U.S. Managed 
Portfolio beats the Wilshire 5000 index for all spans starting prior to 
1984; the Fidelity U.S. Managed Portfolio beats the Wilshire 5000 index 
for all spans starting prior to 1994.
Average performance of Fidelity and Vanguard U.S. 
















































Differential Average Returns for US Index Portfolios:
Fidelity and Vanguard minus Wilshire 5000
Differential Average Returns for US Index 
Portfolios: Fidelity and Vanguard minus 
























Vanguard RA  35 
  
  EXHIBIT 8
Real Values for Fidelity Select Sector Portfolios & the Wilshire 
5000 Index that Grow to $1 in January 2004
The asset weighted loses to the Wilshire 5000 with a bigger 
bubble in 2000; the equal weighted beats the Wilshire 5000 
with a smaller bubble in 2000
Fidelity Select Asset Weighted and Equally 
Weighted Portfolios & Wilshire 5000, Real value 
that grows to $100 in 2004






Fidelity select asset wtd
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  EXHIBIT 9
Real Values for Fidelity & Vanguard International Managed 
Portfolios and the EAFE Index that Grow to $100 in January 
Vanguard beats EAFE, which beats Fidelity
Values for international  portfolios & EAFE Index























2003 26.74 29.94   0.81 0.31 49 20 -28.94 -3.28
2002 -0.67 0.28 34.57 37.16 0.81 0.31 53 20 -0.95 -1.94
2001 -5.21 -4.07 26.13 27.83 0.80 0.31 60 22 -1.14 0.99
2000 -5.94 -4.45 21.48 22.81 0.78 0.30 64 23 -1.48 2.67
1999 -1.23 -0.88 21.56 21.23 0.76 0.30 65 22 -0.35 1.79
1998 2.55 2.07 21.47 20.27 0.74 0.30 65 23 0.48 0.40 1.75 1.68
1997 5.24 5.03 20.82 20.12 0.73 0.30 66 23 0.21 0.08 2.91 2.97
1996 6.42 6.58 19.48 19.06 0.75 0.30 73 23 -0.16 -0.27 3.08 3.20
1995 8.65 8.88 19.42 19.15 0.77 0.31 76 23 -0.23 -0.33 3.82 3.90
1994 7.36 7.73 18.83 18.48 0.78 0.32 79 23 -0.37 -0.48 2.79 2.78
1993 8.35 8.12 18.10 17.55 0.80 0.32 83 23 0.23 0.00 2.54 2.57
1992 8.53 8.01 17.26 16.75 0.81 0.32 88 23 0.52 0.29 3.95 4.08
1991 10.31 9.16 17.82 16.54 0.82 0.33 91 24 1.15 0.46 5.21 4.91
1990 8.56 7.10 18.24 17.43 0.84 0.33 93 23 1.46 1.13 5.56 5.51
1989 9.50 7.61 17.91 16.88 0.85 0.34 93 23 1.89 1.40 5.94 5.77
1988 10.11 8.29 17.44 16.50 0.85 0.35 92 23 1.83 1.33 5.70 5.61
1987 9.30 7.71 17.25 16.18 0.86 0.36 93 24 1.59 1.08 4.30 4.12
1986 9.82 8.29 16.85 15.87 0.87 0.37 94 25 1.53 1.02 3.27 3.56
1985 10.85 9.12 17.00 15.83 0.88 0.38 95 25 1.73 1.06 2.95 3.45
1984 10.18 8.95 16.84 15.44 0.88 0.39 96 25 1.23 0.49 2.64 3.04
1983 10.79 9.62 16.63 15.36 0.88 0.41 96 26 1.16 0.44 2.80 3.17
1982 11.25 10.00 16.35 15.07 0.88 0.42 98 27 1.25 0.47 3.60 3.94
1981 10.17 9.60 16.71 14.87 0.88 0.44 99 27 0.57 -0.37 3.65 3.90
1980 10.44 9.65 16.38 14.54 0.88 0.44 100 27 0.79 -0.22 3.74 4.00
1979 10.21 9.51 16.09 14.27 0.88 0.45 100 28 0.70 -0.33 3.70 3.96
1978 9.83 9.26 15.91 14.05 0.87 0.46 99 28 0.57 -0.48 3.22 3.46






The Fidelity Entire Portfolio vs. the Vanguard Entire Portfolio and 







Fido Van Fido Van
Average real return 
differential vs
Fido  38 
  
EXHIBIT 11
Real Values for Entire Portfolios of Fidelity, Van-
guard & the World index that grow to $100 in 2004
Fidelity beats Vanguard but they are tied from 
1994, with a smaller bubble for Vanguard. The 
decline from the 2000 peak is largest for the World 
index.
Real Values for Entire Portfolios of Fidelity, 
Vanguard & the World index that Grow to 
$100 in 2004
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EXHIBIT 12
Performance Differentials over the Lives of Diversified Fidelity 
Portfolios
Fidelity has higher standard deviations. 
Performance and Standard Deviation 
Differentials: Fidelity Portfolio minus Vanguard 
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Select sector asset wtd
Advisor sector  40 
 
EXHIBIT 13
High expenses and turnover differential shrinks return differential
Risk Adjusted Return Differential (Fidelity minus Vanguard) Explained 
by Expense Ratio & Turnover
Risk Adjusted Return Differential versus Weighted 
Average of Expense Ratio and Turnover Differentials 
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Spartan  index US mgd
Select sector asset wtd
Intl mgd
Entire Advisor U.S. mgd
Advisor Sector asset   41 











5000 EAFE World 
2003 25.68 28.57 35.37 30.02        
2002 -1.81 0.10 5.86 1.27 34.62 35.80 37.19 36.15
2001 -6.33 -4.77 -5.22 -6.20 26.16 27.16 32.50 29.08
2000 -7.64 -6.96 -8.15 -8.61 21.67 22.83 27.50 24.48
1999 -2.82 -1.85 -2.32 -3.02 21.86 23.11 27.45 24.96
1998 1.53 1.69 0.81 0.80 22.52 22.40 25.57 24.20
1997 5.07 4.98 0.47 2.33 22.70 22.27 23.41 22.35
1996 6.82 6.55 0.84 3.34 21.49 20.99 21.68 20.80
1995 9.54 9.20 1.64 4.83 21.77 21.26 20.36 19.89
1994 8.40 7.94 1.96 4.57 20.94 20.52 19.20 18.80
1993 8.26 7.96 4.15 5.81 19.89 19.47 19.74 18.26
1992 7.94 7.77 2.43 4.58 19.03 18.60 19.75 17.96
1991 9.03 9.11 2.67 5.10 18.60 18.43 18.91 17.27
1990 7.76 7.59 0.22 3.00 18.50 18.58 19.98 18.11
1989 8.90 8.59 0.58 3.56 18.35 18.29 19.28 17.55
1988 9.07 8.86 1.85 4.41 17.73 17.69 19.32 17.26
1987 8.77 8.39 3.00 5.00 17.24 17.26 19.31 16.86
1986 9.07 8.58 5.67 6.55 16.75 16.76 23.26 17.85
1985 9.94 9.51 7.64 7.89 16.71 16.78 24.59 18.43
1984 9.54 8.97 7.43 7.53 16.38 16.53 23.98 18.04
1983 9.93 9.43 7.96 7.99 16.04 16.23 23.46 17.68
1982 10.00 9.41 7.08 7.64 15.66 15.84 23.30 17.36
1981 8.74 8.24 6.10 6.52 16.29 16.33 23.24 17.71
1980 9.06 8.63 6.19 6.70 15.99 16.07 22.73 17.33
1979 9.04 8.88 5.77 6.50 15.65 15.76 22.39 17.01
1978 8.66 8.63 6.43 6.60 15.47 15.52 22.17 16.67
1977 8.02 8.19 6.84 6.38 15.53 15.40 21.82 16.40
* Figures in the Exhibits showing superior return are bolded.
The Indexes (%)







money Indx Mgd indx Mgd Indx Mgd
2003 -1.04 27.84 32.08     0.20 0.50 11 38
2002 -0.94 -1.10 -0.25 0.13 36.29 40.13 0.20 0.48 11 42
2001 0.16 -5.08 -4.00 1.94 27.04 29.63 0.20 0.46 10 42
2000 0.70 -7.14 -2.93 1.91 22.67 24.21 0.19 0.40 11 40
1999 0.92 -2.43 -0.45 1.73 22.43 21.53 0.19 0.39 11 39
1998 1.32 1.57 1.75 1.83 22.44 19.88 0.19 0.39 11 40
1997 1.61 5.22 4.84 1.84 22.78 19.97 0.19 0.37 10 39
1996 1.62 6.76 6.62 1.70 21.44 19.09 0.19 0.39 10 38
1995 1.76 9.42 9.08 1.65 21.65 19.39 0.20 0.44 10 37
1994 1.70 8.24 7.86 1.57 20.84 18.76 0.20 0.45 9 36
1993 1.55 8.18 8.20 1.56 19.79 17.81 0.20 0.43 9 35
1992 1.47 7.92 8.35 1.51 18.92 16.98 0.20 0.36 9 35
1991 1.56 9.31 9.61 1.48 18.79 16.88 0.20 0.38 9 34
1990 1.57 7.81 7.41 1.43 18.88 17.91 0.20 0.43 10 33
1989 1.73 8.90 7.77 1.51 18.65 17.29 0.20 0.46 9 32
1988 1.79 9.05 8.56 1.48 18.02 16.97 0.20 0.51 10 33
1987 1.78 8.51 7.79 1.43 17.63 16.76 0.20 0.46 10 33
1986 1.95 8.95 8.16 1.57 17.18 16.31 0.21 0.55 11 33
1985 2.02 9.81 8.92 1.56 17.10 16.17 0.21 0.58 12 32
1984 2.20 9.42 8.80 1.72 16.76 15.76 0.21 0.69 12 33
1983 2.34 9.76 9.49 1.79 16.39 15.68 0.22 0.74 13 34
1982 2.56 10.06 9.90 2.04 16.04 15.40 0.23 0.84 13 34
1981 2.70 8.94 9.56 2.12 16.47 15.15 0.23 0.70 13 33
1980 2.59 9.27 9.59 2.14 16.17 14.82 0.24 0.68 13 34
1979 2.39 9.07 9.45 2.32 15.88 14.54 0.24 0.67 14 34
1978 2.24 8.58 9.21 2.39 15.77 14.31 0.25 0.70 14 34
1977 2.11 7.66 8.68 2.44 16.10 14.31 0.25 0.70 13 33
Expense  
ratio Turnover
The Vanguard Family's U.S. Funds (%)
Average real return Standard deviation  43 
Year Indx Mgd Indx Mgd Indx Mgd Indx Mgd
2003 38.31 35.45   0.34 0.68 7 55
2002 7.18 4.57 39.07 38.69 0.35 0.67 13 46
2001 -3.15 -4.28 33.11 31.74 0.34 0.65 10 47
2000 -7.07 -6.13 28.50 26.42 0.34 0.62 10 48
1999 -1.42 -0.90 27.92 25.84 0.34 0.61 10 46
1998 0.91 1.69 25.45 23.82 0.34 0.61 10 44
1997 0.64 1.64 23.29 21.76 0.35 0.60 9 42
1996 1.24 2.69 21.58 20.29 0.35 0.59 9 41
1995 2.10 3.55 20.29 19.09 0.35 0.59 8 40
1994 2.30 3.14 19.13 18.09 0.35 0.57 8 39
1993 4.44 5.68 19.60 19.43 0.35 0.57 8 40
1992 3.05 4.29 19.33 19.18 0.34 0.56 7 41
1991 3.47 4.29 18.54 18.37 0.34 0.56 8 42
1990 2.58 18.69 0.56 41
1989 3.65 18.46 0.56 41
1988 4.08 17.89 0.56 40
1987 4.67 17.46 0.56 42
1986 6.79 19.87 0.56 41
1985 8.23 20.45 0.56 40
1984 7.55 20.17 0.57 40
1983 8.83 20.63 0.60 43
1982 8.48 20.23 0.62 45
EXHIBIT A3













2003 28.76 32.08 0.67 0.50 82 38 -3.32 0.19
2002 -2.73 -0.25 39.09 40.13 0.67 0.48 83 42 -2.48 -2.84
2001 -6.93 -4.00 29.13 29.63 0.67 0.46 88 42 -2.93 -2.16
2000 -7.96 -2.93 24.03 24.21 0.69 0.40 86 40 -5.04 -1.00
1999 -3.25 -0.45 23.43 21.53 0.69 0.39 85 39 -2.80 -1.40
1998 1.41 1.75 24.14 19.88 0.69 0.39 85 40 -0.34 -0.36 -0.28 -0.28
1997 4.32 4.84 23.27 19.97 0.70 0.37 86 39 -0.51 -0.93 -0.65 -0.78
1996 5.35 6.62 21.66 19.09 0.74 0.39 84 38 -1.26 -1.74 -1.19 -1.32
1995 8.26 9.08 22.19 19.39 0.75 0.44 84 37 -0.82 -1.70 -0.94 -1.23
1994 7.43 7.86 21.17 18.76 0.76 0.45 89 36 -0.43 -1.13 -0.51 -0.70
1993 8.02 8.20 20.13 17.81 0.77 0.43 94 35 -0.17 -0.98 0.06 -0.17
1992 8.20 8.35 19.20 16.98 0.78 0.36 89 35 -0.15 -0.99 0.43 0.20
1991 9.71 9.61 19.18 16.88 0.77 0.38 88 34 0.10 -0.97 0.61 0.26
1990 7.44 7.41 20.06 17.91 0.77 0.43 90 33 0.03 -0.66 -0.15 -0.62
1989 7.88 7.77 19.37 17.29 0.75 0.46 91 32 0.10 -0.64 -0.72 -1.09
1988 8.44 8.56 18.81 16.97 0.75 0.51 93 33 -0.12 -0.86 -0.42 -0.85
1987 7.52 7.79 18.63 16.76 0.74 0.46 96 33 -0.27 -0.93 -0.87 -1.33
1986 7.97 8.16 18.14 16.31 0.73 0.55 97 33 -0.18 -0.90 -0.61 -1.11
1985 8.65 8.92 17.85 16.17 0.73 0.58 98 32 -0.26 -1.00 -0.86 -1.29
1984 8.46 8.80 17.41 15.76 0.73 0.69 98 33 -0.34 -1.06 -0.51 -0.86
The Fidelity Advisor U.S. Managed Portfolio vs. the Vanguard U.S. 
Managed Portfolio and the Wilshire 5000 index (%)
Vanguard
Fido Van
Average Real Return 
Differential vs






















2003 26.41 27.84   0.195 0.197 7 11 -1.43 -2.16
2002 -1.91 -1.10 35.57 36.29 0.191 0.196 6 11 -0.81 -2.02
2001 -5.86 -5.08 26.52 27.04 0.188 0.195 7 10 -0.78 -1.10
2000 -7.50 -7.14 22.08 22.67 0.189 0.194 8 11 -0.36 -0.54
1999 -2.96 -2.43 21.78 22.43 0.189 0.194 7 11 -0.53 -1.11
1998 1.41 1.57 22.48 22.44 0.189 0.193 6 11 -0.15 -0.15 -0.27 -0.27
1997 5.17 5.22 22.97 22.78 0.189 0.193 6 10 -0.05 -0.08 0.19 0.07
1996 6.78 6.76 21.65 21.44 0.204 0.195 6 10 0.02 -0.03 0.24 0.07
1995 9.49 9.42 21.89 21.65 0.215 0.197 7 10 0.07 -0.03 0.29 0.05
1994 8.33 8.24 21.05 20.84 0.224 0.196 7 9 0.09 0.02 0.39 0.21
1993 8.20 8.18 20.00 19.79 0.231 0.195 7 9 0.02 -0.05 0.25 0.06
1992 7.87 7.92 19.14 18.92 0.238 0.195 7 9 -0.04 -0.12 0.10 -0.09
1991 9.19 9.31 18.90 18.79 0.239 0.195 6 9 -0.12 -0.17 0.09 -0.12
1990 7.76 7.81 18.93 18.88 0.242 0.197 6 10 -0.05 -0.06 0.18 0.05





Fido Van Fido Van
Turnover
Average real return 
differential vs
The Fidelity Spartan U.S. Index Portfolio vs. the Vanguard U.S. Index 




























2003 38.19 32.08 1.17 0.50 107 38 6.10 0.64 9.62 4.16
2002 -3.95 -0.25 50.50 40.13 1.12 0.48 115 42 -3.70 3.97 -4.05 3.62
2001 -9.96 -4.00 38.17 29.63 1.08 0.46 118 42 -5.96 3.41 -5.19 4.18
2000 -10.95 -2.93 31.46 24.21 1.08 0.40 120 40 -8.02 4.30 -3.98 8.34
1999 -2.07 -0.45 35.43 21.53 1.11 0.39 119 39 -1.62 6.02 -0.22 7.41
1998 1.43 1.75 32.55 19.88 1.15 0.39 128 40 -0.32 5.13 -0.37 5.14 -0.26 5.20 -0.34 5.25
1997 3.78 4.84 30.14 19.97 1.18 0.37 136 39 -1.05 3.71 -1.84 4.01 -1.19 3.57 -1.81 4.23
1996 5.37 6.62 28.11 19.09 1.21 0.39 136 38 -1.24 2.80 -2.52 3.38 -1.17 2.87 -2.50 3.87
1995 7.79 9.08 27.16 19.39 1.25 0.44 135 37 -1.28 2.31 -3.12 3.29 -1.40 2.20 -3.09 3.80
1994 6.76 7.86 25.95 18.76 1.28 0.45 132 36 -1.10 2.12 -2.59 2.86 -1.18 2.04 -2.57 3.30
1993 7.45 8.20 24.66 17.81 1.31 0.43 133 35 -0.74 2.89 -2.49 3.54 -0.51 3.13 -2.47 4.29
1992 6.00 8.35 24.14 16.98 1.33 0.36 131 35 -2.34 2.64 -3.78 3.30 -1.77 3.22 -3.76 4.36
1991 8.05 9.61 24.32 16.88 1.36 0.38 131 34 -1.56 3.06 -3.68 3.44 -1.05 3.57 -3.57 4.59
1990 6.77 7.41 23.93 17.91 1.38 0.43 130 33 -0.64 3.42 -2.03 3.80 -0.82 3.24 -1.82 3.85
1989 7.85 7.77 23.37 17.29 1.41 0.46 133 32 0.07 3.65 -1.63 4.01 -0.74 2.83 -1.35 3.62
1988 7.08 8.56 22.85 16.97 1.43 0.51 132 33 -1.48 2.72 -2.93 3.22 -1.77 2.42 -2.84 3.23
1987 6.51 7.79 22.31 16.76 1.43 0.46 132 33 -1.29 2.32 -2.54 2.60 -1.89 1.71 -2.52 2.23
1986 6.60 8.16 21.65 16.31 1.42 0.55 130 33 -1.56 1.93 -2.80 2.25 -1.99 1.51 -2.92 2.03
1985 6.70 8.92 21.04 16.17 1.41 0.58 129 32 -2.21 1.87 -3.38 2.23 -2.81 1.28 -3.52 1.95
1984 5.37 8.80 21.27 15.76 1.39 0.69 130 33 -3.43 1.18 -4.32 1.34 -3.60 1.01 -4.42 1.52
1983 6.40 9.49 21.27 15.68 1.39 0.74 128 34 -3.08 0.94 -4.25 1.21 -3.02 1.01 -4.36 1.53











The Fidelity Select Sector Portfolio vs. the Vanguard U.S. Managed portfolio and the 
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2003 27.32 32.08 0.88 0.50 101 38 -4.76 5.26 -1.25 8.77
2002 -1.25 -0.25 35.88 47.02 40.13 0.90 0.48 123 42 -1.00 -1.11 -1.36 -1.46
2001 -7.25 -4.00 27.90 34.64 29.63 0.89 0.46 124 42 -3.25 -1.31 -2.48 -0.55
2000 -8.75 -2.93 23.16 28.30 24.21 0.89 0.40 119 40 -5.82 -0.97 -1.78 3.07
1999 -2.45 -0.45 25.23 27.11 21.53 0.91 0.39 117 39 -2.00 1.72 -0.60 3.12
1998 1.35 1.75 24.40 25.48 19.88 0.96 0.39 120 40 -0.40 2.90 -0.41 2.11 -0.34 2.97 -0.34 2.53
1997 2.53 4.84 22.39 23.91 19.97 1.00 0.37 122 39 -2.31 2.13 -2.42 1.17 -2.45 1.99 -2.45 1.59
























The Fidelity Advisor Sector Portfolio vs. the Vanguard U.S. Managed portfolio and the 
Wilshire 5000 Index (%)
Average real return differential
Average 













2003 43.09 35.45 1.21 0.68 76 55 7.65 7.72
2002 11.34 4.57 39.92 38.69 1.22 0.67 75 46 6.77 5.48
2001 1.44 -4.28 33.32 31.74 1.20 0.65 81 47 5.73 6.66
2000 -5.69 -6.13 30.79 26.42 1.19 0.62 86 48 0.44 2.46
1999 3.51 -0.90 35.61 25.84 1.17 0.61 89 46 4.41 5.83
1998 3.27 1.69 31.94 23.82 1.19 0.61 91 44 1.59 1.06 2.47 2.06
1997 1.84 1.64 29.59 21.76 1.20 0.60 90 42 0.20 0.13 1.37 1.32
1996 2.67 2.69 27.42 20.29 1.20 0.59 89 41 -0.02 -0.31 1.83 1.60
1995 2.59 3.55 25.68 19.09 1.21 0.59 89 40 -0.96 -1.19 0.95 0.76
1994 0.72 3.14 25.01 18.09 1.23 0.57 92 39 -2.42 -2.13 -1.24 -1.00
1993 3.20 5.68 25.23 19.43 1.28 0.57 94 40 -2.48 -2.88 -0.95 -1.33
1992 2.38 4.29 24.31 19.18 1.30 0.56 94 41 -1.91 -2.11 -0.05 -0.23
1991 2.42 4.29 23.28 18.37 1.26 0.56 94 42 -1.86 -2.06 -0.25 -0.42
1990 0.97 2.58 23.04 18.69 1.29 0.56 97 41 -1.61 -1.49 0.76 0.84
1989 1.75 3.65 22.36 18.46 1.31 0.56 99 41 -1.89 -1.90 1.17 1.17
1988 1.92 4.08 21.60 17.89 1.36 0.56 101 40 -2.16 -2.19 0.07 0.06
1987 2.67 4.67 21.11 17.46 1.40 0.56 103 42 -2.00 -2.16 -0.32 -0.41
Expense  
ratio Turnover
The Fidelity International Managed Portfolio vs. the Vanguard 
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2003 39.55 35.45 1.03 0.68 71 55 4.11 4.23
2002 7.96 4.57 39.62 38.69 1.07 0.67 69 46 3.39 2.05
2001 -2.03 -4.28 33.20 31.74 1.06 0.65 78 47 2.25 3.03
2000 -6.71 -6.13 29.02 26.42 1.09 0.62 80 48 -0.58 1.42
1999 1.44 -0.90 32.41 25.84 1.10 0.61 81 46 2.34 3.35
1998 2.80 1.69 29.05 23.82 1.12 0.61 79 44 1.11 0.83 1.67 1.55
1997 3.79 1.64 26.56 21.76 1.13 0.60 78 42 2.14 1.72 3.03 2.83
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APPENDIX B. THE PORTFOLIOS (NOT FOR PUBLICATION) 
 
This appendix lists the funds used to comprise each of the Fidelity synthetic portfolios 
used in this study. The Vanguard funds are listed in Reinker and Tower (2004). 
 
Fidelity Advisor Diversified US Equity Funds   
Aggressive Growth   Dividend Growth   Dynamic Cap Appn  Equity Growth  
Equity Income   Equity Value    Fifty      Growth and Income   
Growth Opportunities Large Capital    Leveraged Co Stock   Mid Cap    
Small Cap    Strategic Growth  Value Strategies   
 
Fidelity Advisor International Funds  
Diversified Intl  Emerging Asia  Emerging Mkt   Europe Capital App 
Japan      Korea      Latin America   Overseas     
 
Fidelity Advisor Sector Funds 
Biotechnology   Consumer Industries  Cyclical Industries   Developng Comm  
Electronics    Financial Services  Health Care    Natural Resources   
Real Estate    Technology    Telecom&Utility   Growth  
 
Fidelity Spartan US Index Funds 
500 Index    Extended Mkt Indx   Total Market Index (Wilshire 5000)   
US Equity Index (S&P 500 Index)   
 
 
Fidelity Spartan International Index Funds 
International Index (MSCI EAFE Index)  
 
Fidelity Regular (non-Advisor) Diversified US Equity Funds 
Aggressive Growth   Asset Manager: Aggressive   Asset Manager: Growth  
Blue Chip Growth   Capital Appreciation  Congress Street   Contrafund      
Disciplined Equity   Discovery      Dividend Growth   Equity Income    
Equity Income II   Fifty       Focused     Growth and Income  
Growth & Income II   Growth Company   Independence    Large Cap Stock    
Leveraged Co Stock   Low Priced Stock   Magellan     Mid-Cap 
New Millennium   OTC       Small Cap     Independence   
Small Cap Stock   Small Cap Retirement Stock Selector   Structured Large Cap 
Growth     Structd Lg Cap Value  Strctd Mid Cap Grw  Strctrd Mid Cap Valu 
Trend      Value      Value Discovery   Value Strategies    
   51 
Fidelity Regular International Funds 
   
Aggressive International  Canada  China Region    Diversified Internatl    
Emerging Market     Europe   Europe Cap Apprecn  Intl Growth & Income  
International Small Cap  Japan    Japan Small Companies  Latin America  
Nordic       Pacific Basin   
 
Fidelity Regular Sector Funds (there are too few of these for us to do anything with 
them in the article) 
Export and Multinational    Real Estate Investment  Utilities   
   
 
Select International Funds (there are too few of these for us to do anything with them 
in the article.) 
Southeast Asia 
 
Fidelity Select Sector Funds 
Air Trans  Automotive  Banking  Biotechnology Brokerage  Business Svc 
Chemicals  Computers  Constr&Hous Consumer In  Cyclical In  Defense&Aer 
Dev Comm   Electronics  Energy   Energy Serv  Environment  Fincl Svcs 
Food & Agri   Gold    Health Care  Home Finan  Ind Eqp  Indust Mat 
Insurance  Leisure  Medical Del  Medical Syst  Multimedia  Natural Gas 
Natural Res   Netw&Infras  Paper&For  Pharma  Retailing  Software 
Technology  Telecommun  Transport  Utilities  Wireless  Automation & 
Machinery  Elec Utilities  Life Insurance  Precious Metals&Minerals  Restaurants 
Note: the last five funds have been killed.  
 
Funds added to make Fidelity entire portfolio complete  
sector 
Export and multinational  Real estate inv   Southeast Asia    Utilities 
 
global 
Advisor global equity   Worldwide  
 
Funds added to make Vanguard entire portfolio complete. 
Dividend growth  Energy   Global equities.  Healthcare  REIT 
 